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French academics reacted too announcements about a possible future European civil
code ten years ago in the way in which Americans reacted to the Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor 1940: first with shock, then with rearmament, finally with attempted
counterattacks. Military metaphors abound. Yet the defense of the French Code Civil
against a European civil code is tricky: they must defend one Code against another. The
images drawn of codes are therefor of particular interest for our understanding both of
civil codes and of legal nationalism. Often, two mutually exclusive images are presented
at the same time. In cultural terms, the code civil is both traditional and revolutionary,
both linguistically determined and independent of its language, both an expression of
values and merely formal and neutral. Politically, the code civil is legitimated both in
democracy and technocracy, it expresses both self-determination and imperialism, it is
about both pluralism and universalism. Necessarily, in such juxtapositions, the same
characteristics must be assigned to a European Code, making the arguments ultimately
self-refuting. Nonetheless, the point is not to dismiss these defenses. Rather, they should
be understood as expressions of faith—and the discussion over a European Code
resembles, in part, a religious war.
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I. Introduction

Sometimes, the best way into a large subject is through a peripheral text. I choose a
brief opening speech by Michel Albert, then President of the Académie des
sciences morales et politiques, on the occasion of the bicentenary of the code civil
in 2004.1 In the beginning, Albert emphasizes the intrinsic Frenchness, of the Code
civil with a familiar quote from Portalis : “Les lois … doivent être adaptées au
caractère, aux habitudes, à la situation du people pour lequel elles sont faites”.2 In
the end of the talk, just a few lines later, Albert turns around completely and .
praises the Code as a universal heritage: “le Code civil ne nous appartient pas à
nous seuls Français — … il est une part de l’héritage de bien des nations”.3
This ostensible inconsistency between a nationalist and an internationalist
conception of the Code Napoléon is not a novelty. Napoleon himself pushed the
Code civil as quintessentially French—and as the model for a European Code, of
which he may have been the first proponent:
Pourquoi mon Code Napoléon n’eût-il pas servi de base à un Code européen…? De la
sorte, nous n’eussions réellement, en Europe, composé qu’une seule et meme famille.
Chacun, envoyageant, n’eût pas cessé de se trouver chez lui.”4

The Code thus combines, since its beginning, two seemingly incompatible
qualities: it is at the same time quintessentially French, and quintessentially
European. In this article, I want to take a closer look at this strange dialectic of
nationalist and internationalist conceptions of the French civil code. I think this
dialectic is more complex and thus more interesting than the frequently invoked
dichotomy between euroskepticism and europhilia—a dichotomy that seems to
assume that the Europe to be loved or hated is a fixed entity, not an idea to be
shaped. And I also think this dialectic suggests a more complex role that
1

Michel Albert, Allocution d’ouverture (2004),
http://www.asmp.fr/fiches_academiciens/textacad/albert/code_civil.pdf.
2
Albert (n. 1) 1. The reference is to Jean-Etienne-Marie Portalis, Discours préliminaire sur
le Code Civil, in id., Discours, rapports et travaux inédits sur le Code Civil (1844, reprint
2010) 1, 4-5. Cf. Book 19 of Charles Montesquieu’s “Esprit des lois”.
3
Albert (n. 1) 3.
4
Emmanuel de Las Cases, Mémorial de Sainte-Hélène, vol. 7 (Paris: Lecointe 1828), 353
Cf. Jean Bart, Le Code Napoléon, Un Code à vocation européenne?, in Jean-Philippe
Dunand/Bénédict Winiger (eds.), Le code civil Français dans le droit européen (Bruylant
2005) 65.
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nationalism plays in the European private law project than as a mere barrier
towards Europeanisation.
For a long time, studies on national resistance to Europe focused especially on
England and the common law. But the English opposition can easily (though
perhaps falsely) be attributed to a clash of cultures or of styles, in particular civil
versus common law, suggesting a European Code would be possible amongst the
civil law countries.5 The fierce French resistance against such a Code suggests that
this is not so easy.6 Its job is harder, however— it must contrast one Code (the
Code civil) against another (the European).
How can French scholars be opposed to something on the European level that they
cherish at home? How are arguments against a European Code not at the same time
arguments against a French Code? How can arguments in defense of the French
Code be protected against appropriation by supporters of a European Code? The
result of my analysis is: by flipping arguments. Flipping is a technique favored by
critical legal studies: “appropriating the central idea of your opponent's argumentbite and claiming that it leads to just the opposite result from the one she
proposes.”7 What is remarkable in the French resistance is that French critics
appropriate their own central ideas and turn them on their heads. The same author,
sometimes within one same text makes both opposite arguments, without worrying
about the internal inconsistency.
Two caveats are in order. First, although I view the critics I use as quite
characteristically French, I do not claim that they are representative of the French
position at large, which is more varied and diverse. Second, although I focus
disproportionally on the use of hyperbole (which is in general more common in
France than elsewhere) and on internal inconsistencies in the arguments, my goal is
not to criticize, or even ridicule, the positions expressed. The goal is a different
one, and it is twofold. First, I want to demonstrate the internal friction in the idea of
5

Mauro Bussani, Faut-il se passer du common law (européen)? Réflexions sur un code
civil continental dans le droit mondialisé, (2010) 62 RIDC 7.
6
An excellent collection of early French comments on the codification of European
Private Law, both positive and negative, is Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson & Denis
Mazeaud (eds), Pensée juridique française et harmonization européenne du droit (2003).
7
Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, in Collected Courses of the Academy
of European Law, Volume Ill, Book 2 (1994) 309, 335.
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a Code itself, between particularity and universalism, that is reflected in this debate.
Second, I want to demonstrate how this internal tension mirrors the difficulties of
determining the place of the nation state within the European project today. Space
constraints prevent comprehensive demonstration of the points made; I hope the
imposed brevity at least makes my argument more pungent.

II. French Positions between Nationalism and Internationalism

Parallels between today’s situation and that of 1804 are revealing, but they have at
least one important limitation. In 1804, when the French Civil Code was enacted, it
clearly established France’s leading position in European private law.
Anniversaries of the Code, however, were less fortunate. When the Code turned
100, in 1904, the German civil code, entered into force just four years earlier, made
the French Code look old and antiquated.8 In 2004, for the bicentennial, the
situation was even worse. In that same year, the World Bank published its first
Doing Business Report, which found civil law systems to be inferior to common
law systems and ranked the French legal system forty-fourth—behind Jamaica,
Botswana, and Tonga.9 Closer to home, the project of a European Code threatened
to replace the French Civil Code altogether.
The first shock for France had come some years earlier. The EU Commission
inquiry on a European contract law in 2001 alreay created concern in France, where
the Europeanization of private law had not been taken too seriously before.10 In
2002 then Christian von Bar gave his now infamous presentation in Paris, in the

8

Yves Lequette, D’une celebration à l’autre, in 1804-2004: Le Code civil—un passé un
présent un avenir (2004) 9, 11-12.
9
Doing Business in 2004: Understanding Regulation. On the French reactions, see, in
English, Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson & Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson & Anne-Julie
Kerhuel, Is Law an Economic Contest? French Reactions to the Doing Business World
Bank Reports and Economic Analysis of the Law, (2009) 57 Am. J. Comp. L. 811;
Catherine Valcke, The French Response to the World Banks’ Doing Business Reports, 60
University of Toronto Law Journal 197 (2010).
10
Even though the idea of a European private law, or even a codification, had been
discussed in France before. See, the references in Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson, Faut-il
un code civil européen?, RTDCil 2002, 463 no. 1 note 2. Christian von Bar himself had
presented the project before, in French; see Christian von Bar, Le groupe d’études sur un
Code civil, 53 REV. INT. DROIT COMP. 127 (2001).
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Cour de Cassation, on the project of European codification.11 The existence of the
project alone was a shock. That it was put forward by a German apparently
resonated with memories of the German invasions into France in the past; the
military language in some of the critiques suggests that much.12 But the real
outrage appears to have been that Prof. von Bar spoke “en anglais, et ce dans la
Grand’ Chambre de la Cour de cassation”13.
It is hardly an exaggeration to compare the effect of that speech on the French
academic establishment to that of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. An
unexpected attack demonstrated that, unbeknownst to the victim, an enemy that had
been ignored for a long time had already been arming itself for some time. And it
was a dual archenemy from way back: Germany, von Bar’s home country, and
England, the country whose language he spoke. The French reacted as the
Americans reacted to Pearl Harbor: first with shock, then with their own
rearmament, then with a counterattack.
1. First Reaction: Shock and Outrage

Speaking of attacks, rearmament, and archenemies may seem hyperbolic, but it
merely reflects the style of the debate. One French scholar compares the project to
unify European private law to the identity politics of Nazi Germany, the Soviet
Union, and Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge14 - the European civil code as some
kind of cultural genocide. Another scholar teaching in France calls the project
11

Christian von Bar, Des principes à la codification: perspectives d’avenir pour le droit
privé européen, Les Annonces de la Seine, 3 June 2002, no. 33, p. 1-4 ; republished as
Christian von Bar, From Principles to Codification: Prospects for European Private Law,
(2002) 8 Col. J. Eur. L. 379.
12
The discussion is placed in the centuries old relation between France and Germany by
Yves Lequette, De la France et de l’Europe: La nation ou l’empire, in Études à la mémoire
du professeur Bruno Oppetit (2009) 411, where la nation stands for France, l’empire for the
Holy Roman Empire, i.e. Germany. See especially ibid. 457 ff.
13
Albert (note 1) 2; Yves Lequette, Quelques remarques à propos du projet de code
civil européen de M. von Bar, Dalloz 2002 chron. 2202 = Pensée juridique (n. 6) 69, no. 1.
Albert contrasts this to Basil Markesinis “Notons toutefois que notre confrère, lui, s’est
exprimé en français.” Albert did not return the favor completely, he managed to misspell
both Sir Basil’s first and last name (“Basile Marchesinis”). But then, Markesinis’s own
spelling of foreign names is rarely accurate; see the examples in Ralf Michaels, Book
Review, 10 ZeuP 903 (2002). For Markesinis’ own remarks at the Cour de Cassation,
including criticism of von Bar, see Basil Markesinis, Deux cents ans dans la vie d'un code
célèbre. Réflexions historiques et comparatives à propos des projets européens, RTD CIV.
2004, 45-60;. English version: Two hundred years of a Famous Code – What Should We
Be Celebrating?, 39 Tex. Int’l L.J. 561 (2004).
14
Lequette (note 13) 23.
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“politically

complicitous,

inherently

oppressive,

and

fundamentally

antihumanistic”15 and, in naming his article “Antivonbar”, invokes a tradition of
polemical ad hominem attacks like Frederic the Great’s Anti-Machiavell, Lessing’s
Anti-Goeze or Engels’ Anti-Dühring. The authors of European private law are
considered “des individus, dont l’expérience fait apparaître qu’ils sont dépourvus

de tout scrupule.”16 When von Bar suggests that France and Germany were once
one, under Charlemagne, he finds the response that the third Reich used the same
argument to justify the collaboration.17
2. Second Reaction: Rearmament: Reform of the Code Civil

The shock —sometimes referred to as an electric shock18—a led to action.19
Scholars presented the Avant-projet Catala, aimed at a reform of the French law of
obligations.20 Although the project may look purely domestic, both its origin and its
aim are deeply European.21 It was spurred by a conference that compared the Lando
Principles and the French Code Civil and found important differences.22 The threat
of a European Code civil that would differ from French law was thus an important

15

Pierre Legrand, Antivonbar, (2005) 1 Journal of Comparative Law 13, 27.
Yves Lequette, Le Code européen est de retour, (2011) Revue des contrats 1028, 1031
note 15.
17
Lequette (note 16) 1042, citing to Bernard Bruneteau,“L’Europe nouvelle” de Hitler: Une
illusion des intellectuels de la France de Vichy (2003). Charlemagne has always been
claimed for both French and German national identity; see, most recently, Robert John
Morrissey, Charlemagne & France: a thousand years of mythology (2003). For the
historical Charlemagne’s role for Europe, see Rosamond McKitterick Charlemagne: The
Formation of a European Identity (2008).
18
Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson & Sara Patris-Godechot, Le Code civil face à son destin
(2006) 153.
19
A useful summary and evaluation in English is Ruth Sefton-Green, The DCFR, the
Avant-projet Catala and French Legal Scholars: A Story of Cat and Mouse?, (2008) 12
Edinburgh Law Review 351.
20
Pierre Catala (ed.) Avant-projet de réforme du droit des obligations et de la prescription
(La documentation Franc aise, Paris, 2006); English translation by John Cartwright/Simon
Whittaker, in John Cartwright/Stefan Vogenauer/Simon Whittaker (eds), Reforming the
French Law of Obligations: Comparative Reflections on the Avant-projet de reforme du
droit des obligations et de la prescription (‘the Avant-projet Catala) (2009) 445. For a
helpful introduction in English, see Stefan Vogenauer, The Avant-projet de réforme: An
Overview, ibid. at 3. The entire book has been published in French, too: John
Cartwright/Stefan Vogenauer/Simon Whittaker (eds), Regards comparatistes sur l’avantprojet de réforme du droit des obligations et de la prescription (2010).
21
Séverine Nadaud, Codifier le droit civil européen (2008) 321-36.
22
Pierre Catala, General Presentation of the Reform Proposals, in Cartwright/Whittaker
(note 20) 9, no 2. See Dominique Fenouillet & Pauline Rémy-Corlay (eds), Les concepts
contractuels à l’heure des principes du droit europén des contrats (2003).
16
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reason for the response.23 Catala provides yet another military reference, this one
quite stunning: it will not do to say that things are good enough as they are, because
that was what the French on the eve of the desaster of 1940.24 Hitler’s invasion
found the French unprepared; von Bar will find more resistance.
The aim is not just to protect the French code, however, but also to regain influence
on Europe:25 “Our hope is that the Reform Proposals serve the purpose which will
give France a civil law adapted to its time and a voice at the table of Europe.”26 Not
least towards that purpose, the commission almost immediately requested
translations into five languages (including two different translations into English),
thus greatly broadening the potential audience.27
Reactions to the project, both within and outside of France,28 were largely positive,
though the project was also lambasted as “franco-français”.29 The near-total
absence of comparative law influence was one reason for criticism.30 Puzzlement
emerged especially over the commission’s decision to maintain, and even extend,
“in accordance with our legal tradition,”31 the role of la cause.32 The cause in

23

Denis Mazeaud, Observations conclusives, Revue des contrats 2006, 179.
Pierre Catala, L’avant-projet de réforme des obligations et le droit des affaires, in Vincent
Sagaert (ed.), La réforme du droit privé en France – Un modèle pour le droit privé
européen? (2009) 85, 85.
25
Sébastian Pimont, À propos du processus de réforme du droit français des contrats,
Revue juridique Thémis 43 (2009) 439, 443ff.
26
Catala (note 22) no. 9; cf. Catala (note 24) 87: “Qui ne voit que, dans le Concert des
Nations, la voix et le poids de la France sortiraient renforcés de son Code civil?” The hope
that the French Code civil could provide a model has long accompanied reform projects.
Claude Witz, “La longue gestation d’un code européen des contrats – Rappel de quelques
initiatives oubliées”, (2003) RTDC 447.
27
Collected in Pierre Catala (ed), L’art de traduction: L’accueil international de l’avantprojet de réforme du droit des obligations (2011).
28
Summarized by Vogenauer (supra note 20) 15-17.
29
Denis Tallon, Teneur et valeur du projet appréhendé dans une perspective comparative,
Revue des contrats 2006, 131; Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson, “La réforme du droit
franc ais des contrats: perspective comparative”, Revue des contrats 2006, p.147.
30
See Denis Tallon, Teneur et valeur du projet appréhendé dans une perspective
comparative, Revue des contrats 2006, 132; Christophe Jamin, Vers un droit européen des
contrats? (Réflexion sur une double stratégie), (2006) RTD com. 94, 101.
31
Jacques
Ghestin,
Validity—Cause
(articles
1124
to
1126-1),
in
Cartwright/Vogenauer/Whittaker (note 20) 521 (originally in Catala (note 20) 25.
32
Cf., in English, Judith Rochfeld, A Future for la cause? Observations of a French Jurist,
in John Cartwright/Stefan Vogenauer/Simon Whittaker (eds), Reforming the French Law of
Obligations: Comparative Reflections on the Avant-projet de reforme du droit des
obligations et de la prescription (‘the Avant-projet Catala) (2009) 73; Ruth Sefton-Green,
La cause or the Length of the French Judiciary’s Foot, ibid at 101.
24
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particular was deemed unlikely to be influential in Europe.33 In result, this
assessment seems fair: la cause had become a French peculiarity in Europe34 (even
though its Aristotelian origins are of course not at all peculiarly French). The
authors of the Lando Principles had explicitly rejected it (to the surprise and dismay
of French commentators.)35 But the critique misses what the project is about. The
goal was to influence European private law, not the other way around. In this sense,
differences between the Code and the Lando Principles were not a problem but a
potential asset.36 The cause is thus defended precisely because it is un-European:37
Comment pourrait-on, au demeurant, aspirer à ce que la France reste elle-me me et
cultive son irritante exception alors que sa banalisation et sa dissolution dans le
conformisme européen ouvrent à ceux qui en sont les artisans des perspectives si
chatoyantes?38

The project was not ultimately successful. The chancellery adopted its own
project,39 using more comparative law than the Catala Avant-projet and suggesting
abolition of la cause.40 Academics around François Terré prepared a countercounterproposal.41 Whether any one of them will become law is not yet fully
certain.

33

Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson, “La réforme du droit franc ais des contrats: perspective
comparative”, RDC 2006, p.147; Muriel Fabre-Magnan, Entretien, La Semaine Juridique
(JCP) éd. Gén. 2008.I.199; Denis Mazeaud, Réforme du droit des contrats: haro, en
Hérault, sur le projet!, D. 2008, 2675, nos 9-11.
34
Cf. Vittoria Bassani/Wolfgang Mincke, Europa sine causa?, (1997) ZEuP 599.
35
Jean Beauchard, L’absence de la cause dans les principes européens de droit des
contrats, in Jean-Pierre Marguénaud, Michel Massé, Nadine Poulet-Gibot (eds), Apprendre
à douter. Questions de droit, questions sur le droit, Études offertes à Claude Lombois
(2004) 819.
36
Catala (note 22) no 8.
37
Alain Ghozi & Yves Lequette, La réforme du droit des contrats: brèves observations sur
le projet de la chancellerie, D. 2008, 2609.
38
Lequette (note 16) 1031. Similarly Miguel Pasquau Liaño, L’abandon de la notion de
“cause” en droit franc ais : un service au droit européen des contrats ?, (2010) 1 Revue
de droit d’Assas 68, 69: “cacher la cause pour surmonter l’isolément du droit franc ais
n’est pas tellement différent de ce qui supposerait de renoncer à la langue franc aise pour
favoriser l’intégration linguistique des peuples européens.”
39
Denis Mazeaud, La réforme du droit français des contrats, Revue juridique Thémis 44
(2010) 243.
40
Christian Larroumet, De la cause de l’obligation à l’intérêt au contrat, D. 2008, 2441.
41
François Terré (ed), Pour une réforme du droit des contrats (2008).
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3. Third Reaction: Counterattack: French Participation in Europeanization

If the reform of French law has an only indirect impact on French law, other French
projects aim at direct participation in the development of European law. Yet
another (rather incredible) military argument is suggested in favor of uniformity of
law (albeit on the basis of French law): the German-French war of 1870/71 could
have been avoided if only Prussia had adopted the French Civil Code.42 In
particular, two French legal association joined the European network in 2005: the
Association Henri Capitant des Amis de la Culture Juridique Française and the
Société de législation comparée. Given how far European projects had advanced
with limited French input, not many areas for influence remained, but two were
found and published in 2008: “Terminologie contractuelle commune” and
“Principes contractuels communs”. The hope was that this could influence the
European project even at this late stage:
There are a number of ways in which this work could contribute to the wider European
project. The work on the guiding principles could form part of the CFR, in the form of
blackletter model rules or of recitals. The work on terminology is, in itself, most useful
for the elaboration of the final version of the CFR. It finds its place with the materials
which will accompany the model rules. Last but not least : the revised version of the
Principles of European contract law (PECL) should be considered, by the European
institutions, as an alternative set of model rules on contract law. As PECL, it adopts a
simple structure, with clear and concise rules. This revised version includes comments
on PECL which are particularly innovative and valuable.”43
Their success has been moderate. Granted, the European Parliament singled out these
works as relevant; the authors of the Draft Common Frame of Reference reformulated,
under their influence, the “principles” underlying their codification.44 Their rules however
were not changed much, and the Commission seems not to have paid a lot of attention to

42

Philippe Malaurie, Le code civil europén des obligations et des contrats – Une question
toujours ouverte, JCP 2002.1.110 no 11 = Pensée juridique (note 6) 219, 224.
43
See also Bénédicte Fauvarque-Cosson, Droit europén des contrats: les offres sont
faites, les dés non encore jetés, D. 2008, 557.
44
For criticism, see Martijn Hesselink, 'If You Don’t Like our Principles We Have Others';
On Core Values and Underlying Principles in European Private Law: A Critical Discussion
of the New 'Principles' Section in the Draft CFR, in The Foundations of European Private
Law, pp. 59-72, (R. Brownsword, H. Micklitz, L. Niglia & S. Weatherill, eds., 2011).
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them. The French authors of these works are, in the words of one French critic, like
Lenin’s “useful idiots”45.

III. Cultural Images
In defending a French against a European Code, French critics invoke a number of
arguments, but they can be grouped, roughly, under two headings: cultural, and political.
Among the cultural topics, the most frequent argument holds the culture of a French
Code against the lack of culture of a European Code. Closer analysis reveals that the
opposite is argued as well: a European Code must be rejected precisely because it
represents a culture.
1. Tradition versus Revolution

In one frequent juxtaposition, the French code is the fruit of tradition, while a European
Code would represent a break with traditions. Lequette recounts how generations of
French professors synthesized the principles of French law, until the code civil could be
written in less than four months, based widely on the writings of Pothier46. Similarly, the
Catala project starts with praise for Portalis and Carbonnier, both of whom “had the same
perspective of history, a deep understanding of the customs and traditions which make up
the ‘spirit of the centuries’ and the sense that ‘it is right to save everything that it is not
necessary to destroy”.47 As Portalis said, “The Codes of nations are the fruit of the
passage of time; but properly speaking, we do not make them.” The European code, this
implies, is not just “étranger à la culture francaise,”48 but opposed to all culture: it has no
tradition at all – the ius commune not withstanding.49 The unity created by the French
code had grown over centuries, while the unity created by a European code has not.50 The
European code project is thus an “utopie … sans racines historiques ni culturelles,”51 It
breaks, in other words, with existing tradition.

45

Lequette (note 16) 1031.
Lequette (note 13) no. 24; See also Jean-Louis Halpérin, L’impossible code civil (1992).
47
Catala (note 22) no 1.
48
Philippe Malaurie, “Petite note sur le projet de réforme du droit des contrats”, JCP (G)
2008.I.204.
49
Cf. Jean-Louis Halpérin, Retour à un droit commun européen, in Pensée juridique (note
6) 15.
50
Lequette, (note 8) 31-32.
51
Philippe Malaurie, L’utopie et le bicentenaire du Code Civil, in 1804-2004 (note 8) 1, 7-8.
46
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This is ironic. After all, such breaking with traditions is intrinsic to the French Code civil,
too. When the Code civil was established, after the Revolution, one main purpose was to
supplant old traditions—legal traditions, especially those of droit commun and droit écrit,
but also, of course, ideological traditions of the ancien régime. Tellingly, then, the civil
code is today advertised as the proper instrument of legal reform for such countries that
lack their own legal tradition.52 And now, it is the European Civil Code that is criticized
as being stuck in tradition. Christian von Bar is ridiculed for placing the Code in the
tradition of Charlemagne, and thus ignoring the 1200 years of subsequent history.53
2. Language: National vs. Universal Language

A related issue concerns language, an issue invoked far more frequently in France than
elsewhere. The code civil is intrinsically linked to the French language.54 The Code is
regularly praised frequently for its style, for its clarity. Stendhal, thus the oft-repeated
legend, would read a line from the code before writing any lines, in order to clarify his
style.55 Moreover, the Code civil itself is like a language. European law, by contrast, has
no such language;56 it is, in the words of one critic, a legal Babel.57 And a European Code
would not resemble a grown language but would be artificial—a “volapük juridique,”58

52

Association Henri Capitant des amis de la culture juridique française, Les droits de
tradition civiliste en question—À propos des Rapports Doing Business de la Banque
Mondiale (2006) 82.
53
Lequette (note 20) no. 11; Lequette (note 16) 1042.
54
Gérard Cornu, L’art d’écrire la loi, in (2003) 107 Pouvoirs – Le code civil 5.
55
Stendhal may have been partly in jest; the legend has been used less to praise the Code
and more to criticize Stendhal. See M.L. Newman, Stendhal and the Code civil, (1970) 43
The French Review 434.
56
Gérard Cornu, Un code civil n’est pas un instrument communautaire, Dalloz 2002 chron.
351 = Pensée juridique 57, 58: “Il n’y a pas de langue européenne.”
57
Malaurie (note 12) no 13, p. 225.
58
Lequette (note 13) no 13 ; Lequette (note 16) 1044. See for the term already Edmond
Picard, Le droit et sa diversité nécessaire d’après les races et les nations, Clunet 28
(1901) 417, 422 ; Gérard Blandin, Les interférences de la linguistique et du droit, in Nicole
M. le Douarin & Cathérine Puigelier (eds), Science, Éthique et Droit (2007) 33, 58.

11

an “Esperanto juridique”59. It would thus share the fate of other artificial languages with
no depth.60
Again, however, this pair of images is found reversed. In the reversal, the French code
civil itself overcame the “babel juridique”61 of different laws and languages in France.
More, the Code Civil represents a universal language beyond France: Not only has the
Code civil provided a model for numerous other codes;62, it has been translated numerous
times. In the same vein, the Avant-Projet Catala was translated into six different
languages to increase immediately its global reception. In this image, the strength of the
Code Civil lies not in its close link to French language but rather in the universality of its
language, its translatability. And now it is the European code, by contrast, that has its
own peculiar language. In one way, this is the technical language of European
bureaucracy – a language particular not to one specific country but to one group, and
therefore not universal. Or, worse, the peculiar language of the European Code is
English—the language of a common law system!63 In response to this universalism, the
French no longer oppose a babel juridique; they now insist on linguistic pluralism (by
which they mean: the use French in addition to English).
3. Values versus Neutral Rationality

A third pair of images concerns the spirit of the law, especially (cultural) values and
neutral rationality. Often, we read that private law concerns, primarily, “la culture,
l’identité, la psychologie collective … de chaque peuple.” The French Code civil
represents such values from the beginning, but it has also, in turn, entered into the French
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consciousness.64 This emphasis on cultural values includes the law of contracts, which is
cultural (and thus necessarily linked to the nation state.)65 A European Civil Code, by
contrast, has no spirit, no soul; it is “un syncrétisme juridique purement technique, sans
racine, sans esprit et sans âme, de nulle part et de nulle époque”66 Or, at best, it represents
a cold economic rationality—like the common law, which the Doing Business Report
appears to prefer, which (it is said) prioritizes efficiency over values.
And yet, in the flip version of the argument, it is the European Code which rests on
values—thought they are the wrong ones. The authors of the Code are biased—main
proponents like Christian von Bar and Bénédicte Fauvqraue-Cosson (the French member
in the Commission).67 By contrast, neutral institutions are opposed to the Code, among
them the Fédération bancaire franc aise and the Mouvement des Entreprises de France.68
And indeed, in this juxtaposition the quality of the French code civil is precisely how it
overcame the various irrational cultures of the ancien régime and replaced them with the
rationality of natural law.
IV. Political Images

Related ideas concern not culture but politics. There is no doubt that the French Code
civil is a political symbol, and a European Code would aim at the same role. Here,
however, I want to focus only on political legitimacy. Legitimacy can refer to a code’s
internal legitimacy, and it can refer to external legitimacy towards other countries.
1. Democracy vs. Technocracy

First internal legitimacy. In one pair of images, the code stands for French sovereignty,
fought for through revolution and the liberation from feudalism, and thus for democracy
and sovereignty. The code civil thus retains an eminently public, even constitutional,
character; it is a “constitution civile.”69 In particular, the ban on case law in its Article 5
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is viewed as an expression of democracy70—even though of course case law plays a
prominent role in France today, and legal systems with a case law like the English one
can hardly be called undemocractic. And the code is an emblem of democracy—even if it
did not arise from a democratic process, it displays, in the words of Raymond Troplong
in the 19th century, an “esprit démocratique.”71 An EU code, by contrast, has no basis in
the Treaties,72 and the entire European Union lacks legitimacy, at least beyond economic
law.73 The occasional suggestion that a European code could one day become the civil
Constitution of Europe74 is not popular in France. Moreover, the group developing a
European code lacks democratic legitimacy, given that it consists only of experts not
appointed by any state75. Nor do the EU institutions have the necessary legitimacy in
participatory democracy.76 Theirs is a product based on technocratic expertise, not
popular vote—a project favored by a bureaucracy that wants to extend its powers just
because it is there, like the Soviet nomenklatura.77
There is, however, again a contrasting pair of images. In this contrasting pair, the French
Code stands for the genius not of democracy but of monarchy and imperialism.
Monarchism is present in the continued veneration of Napoléon Bonaparte’s active role
in the makin of the French Code.78 Napoléon’s famous quote, according to which his
code will be the basis of his fame more than any military victories, is cited incessantly
(though abridged).79 The code is an imperial code, says Jean Foyer in admiration.80 (It is
(note 8) 297; Rémy Cabrillac, Le Code civil est-il la véritable constitution de la France ?,
(2005) 39 Revue juridique Thémis 245.
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also a professorial Code—the Avant-projet Catala, like the Lando Principles, was
authored by self-appointed professors, not by public vote.)81 And now the problem of the
European Code is that it is not imperial enough. It is doubtful that the European project
can succeed unless it is supported by “la magie, un charisme de géant.”82 Von Bar may be
Pol Pot, but he is no Napoleon.
2. Self-Determination vs. Imperialism

Closely related is the idea that the French Code Civil is an emblem of national
sovereignty and self-determination. France, we read, brought the idea of (national)
sovereignty to Europe,83 and the French Code is an expression of that sovereignty. The
Code is a Code by and for the French. As such, it defies hegemonialist tendencies: “le
droit français n’a conçu d’ambition pour autrui, seulement appliqué à se réformer luimeme.”84 But if French law is the lamb, European law is the wolf85 that will not allow
such self-determination. What is aimed for –

“un super-Etat qui domine les Etats

subordonnés,”86 – is hegemonialist. The project for a European Civil Code is a
totalitarian one,87 directed against such self-determination.
Again, this pair can be found flipped as well. The French Code is about French selfdetermination, but towards others it has also always been about imperialism. The
expansion of the Code around Europe and the world88 has always been a way for France
to impose its power. That this influence has already declined89 is deplored because it
reduces the power of France over other countries. This leads to an opposite argument for
the French Code: the French Code perpetuates also European influence on foreign
as well: “ce sont les procès-verbaux de mon conseil d’État; ce sont les recueils de ma
correspondance avec mes ministres; c’est enfin tout le bien que j’ai fait comme
administrateur, comme réorganisateur de la grande famille française.” Charles Tristan
Montholon, Récits de la Captivité de l'Empereur Napoléon à Sainte-Hélène I (1847) 401.
80
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countries.90 If the code civil is lost, European influence on the rest of the world will
suffer. Even a reform of the French Code alone will reduce this influence if it makes the
Code less French by abandoning la cause.91 A European civil code cannot likely flourish
in the same way,92 not least because the drafters of a European Code forget about the
importance of imperialist thought.
3. Pluralism vs. Universality

A last pair of images is that of uniformity and pluralism. The Portalis quote mentioned in
the introduction is a frequent reference in France: laws must be made differently for
different peoples.93 The French Code is inseparably linked to French identity – it is based
on this identity and in turn contributes to this identity. The same is true in theory for other
countries (even though French authors do not pay particular attention to those.)94
European codification aims at establishing (or reestablishing) a European culture95, a
European national identity.96 But this is futile: A European Code would be a utopia, the
law of no place, a false empty universalism. The uniformity brought about by a European
Code would be a futile attempt to erase differences between peoples, “un levier
permettant d’accentuer et d’accélérer la fusion des peuples de l’Europe en une seule
entité.”97 Europe is necessarily plural;98 its plurality is that of nation states: “le génie de
l’Europe tient dans sa profonde diversité”.99 Cabrillac suggests that “la nation doit
précéder le Code et non l’inverse”
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And yet this is a strange flip of the old image of the French Code as universalist and
antipluralist.100 Portalis was the first to emphasize how the Code civil overcame regional
identities:
Nous ne sommes plus Provençaux, Bretons, Alsaciens, mais Français … la loi est la mère
commune des citoyens, elle leur accorde une égale protection à tous.101

Lequette makes the same point in favor of nations, now against a Europe of Regions:
Les régions qui sont appelées à prendre la suite des nations se définissent, en effet, dans
la conception allemande par une communauté, rélle ou plus ou moins fantasmatique,
d’essence ethnique: les Corses, les Basques, les Flamands, les Bretons, les Provençeaux,
les Occitans, les Savoyards, etc.102

In fact, we might say that the French Code civil was not made by the nation; it made the
nation—an insight that would mirror Anderson’s point that nation states create the
nations they embody, not the other way round.103 And this universalism works externally
as well. From the beginning, the natural law ideas underlying the Code aimed at potential
universality.104 The code is “l’expression d’un droit naturel universel et d’un véritable jus
commune valable en tous pays;”105 this universalism was a core reason for its global
success.106 but this is true only for a grown code like the French one. A European Civil
Code, as a mere collection of rules, could not achieve the same universal character.107
V. What to Make of all This

The main gist of all these arguments may seem obvious. Where a European Code
threatens to replace the code civil with something different, it must be opposed. Where,
by contrast, the code civil is allowed to become a European Code—whether directly,
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through adoption elsewhere, or indirectly, through stronger influence on European
lawmaking, Europeanization is supported. The arguments for national particularity and
self-determination apply to France, not really to others. The French internationalism is, in
reality, a French hegemonialism. If this is so, then nationalism and internationalism are
two sides of the same coin and mutually consistent positions—even if the images of code
that are used for their support are not.
And yet, this alone does not prove the counterposition right. It does not seem crazy for
French critics to view the German position towards a European civil code as an
imperialist one.108 If the Germans are more influential at the moment, this may be all the
more reason to oppose them. Moreover, although the positions of critics are internally
incoherent, quite likely the same dichotomy could be demonstrated amongst proponents
of a European code who face the same problem—to defend one code against another.
It would thus be inadequate to reject the French positions as signs of parochialism and
nationalistic arrogance. Of course they are, but not necessarily any more so than those of
proponents of a European Code. Nationalism may have a pejorative meaning today. But
if Lequette is right and its opposition is empire, then it is not clear which is better.109
Moreover, we know that nationalism tends to rise in times of turmoil and crises of
legitimacy—either after revolutions, or in face of outside pressure. France is experiencing
a time of outside pressure, with a growing feeling that French law and the Code Civil are
in decline.110 No wonder that people remember fondly the time of the Code’s greatest
strength.
I believe we gain more if we take the inconsistencies in the French position as
representative not just of the French but instead of modern law more generally. What we
see is an expression of a general problem of both modern law, especially in the traditional
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form of codification,111 and of nationalism (which of course once was modern)—the
tension between nationalism and universalism,112 internal peace and external violence,
between inclusion and exclusion,113 rationalism and antirationalism.114 Such tensions can
be patched over within one legal system, but where two structurally comparable projects
confront each other, they come to the fore. If the critics fail to present a coherent defense
of the French code civil, they are nonetheless successful in the critique of a European
code, insofar as the inconsistency of their position applies to the latter as well. If the
French code falls, so does the European code.
Inconsistency is not necessarily failure—it can, and often is, overcome by an act of
faith.115 George Fletcher once referred to the Code as one of three “nearly sacred books”
of the Western legal tradition.116 Indeed, its veneration has always had somewhat
religious characteristics;117 its support seems a matter not just of ratonality but of faith.
This matches not only Alain Supiot’s suggestion for a religious basis of our modern
law.118 It is also in accordance with Ulrich Wehler’s suggestion that nationalism has a
quasi-religious element to it.119 The French code civil, like the French nation, may once
have been the essence of modernity. Against the conflicting modernity of the EU and a
European Code, it is reinvented as a premodern artefact, worthy of protection just
because it is there.
And yet, the frequent invocation of military metaphors are worrying. What we see is
reminiscent of a religious war. Different sects within the same religion (the civil law)
111
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fight aggressively, although—or perhaps because—their positions are so close to each
other. And they request two things simultaneously: the freedom to exercise their religion
(expressed as nationalism) , and the recognition of their religion as the official one
(expressed as internationalism.) Now, Europe has its experience with such religious
wars. Perhaps, in due course, the differences between a French and a European Code will
look as subtle as those between Protestants and Catholics look to many of us today. Until
then, it would be foolish to underestimate their potential.
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